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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of family control on French acquirers’ performance. We 
consider a sample of 239 acquisitions undertaken by French listed companies between 
January 1997 and December 2006. Comparing both, short-term and long-term performance, 
we find that family-controlled firms outperform non-family firms. We find that the 
relationship depends on the control level.  The higher operating performance of family firms 
is statistically significant for an intermediate level of control. Around the announcement date, 
family firms with a high level of control outperform non-family firms. Using the calendar 
time approach, we find that long-term stock performance of family firms is positive and 
statistically significant. Robustness tests show that our findings seem to not be driven by the 
endogeneity problem. Finally, we find that family wedge, due to the use of the pyramidal 
structure and the double voting rules, has no statistical significant effect.   
 
Keywords: Acquisitions, family firms, agency theory, stock performance, operating 
performance 
JEL classification: G32, G34 
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1. Introduction 
Family-controlled firms are one of the most developed forms of concentrated ownership 
around the world. La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002) 
show that the image of a publicly traded company with dispersed ownership structure, classic 
owner-manager conflicts, and a free-rider problem is not an appropriate image for most 
countries. These authors indicate that concentrated ownership is typical for Western Europe 
and for Asia. However, Holderness (2009) finds that the ownership of U.S. firms is similar to 
the ownership of firms of other countries. Villalonga and Amit (2009) highlight the high level 
of family controlled firms in the U.S. 
Faccio and Lang (2002) find that only 14% of French firms are widely held and that 
64.82% are controlled by a single family. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) also show a high 
presence of family firms in the French stock market. They find that two thirds of firms are 
family controlled. However, in the U.S. market only 40% of firms are considered as family 
firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2009). According to Bach (2010), more than one out of five 
employees working in significant French companies are under the management of a relative 
of the founder. Most of research studies consider U.S. family firms that operate in a 
developed financial market environment characterized by a strong investor protection. By 
contrast, French family firms, less frequently studied, operate in legal and institutional 
environments characterized by a weak investor protection and giving greater importance to 
banks than to the stock market (Franks et al, 2012). The French market is also characterized 
by a high level of wedge due to the pyramidal structure and the double voting rule. It 
represents a favorable context to study family firms. 
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Several studies analyze the impact of family ownership on firm value. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) and Barontini and Caprio (2006) find that family firms outperform non-family 
firms. Andres (2008) highlights the importance of distinguishing between different types of 
blockholders when analyzing firm value (financial, managerial, family, employees, 
government) because of their different goals and policies. 
This paper analyzes the impact of family control on firm performance following an 
acquisition. Mergers and acquisitions represent an interesting framework to analyze 
investment policy. The research on this subject has listed several motivations that explain the 
occurrence of mergers and acquisitions. Examples include synergies (Healy et al., 1992), 
empire building (Jensen, 1986), and protection of private benefits (Gorton et al., 2009). The 
ownership structure plays an important role in defining the operation motivations, since 
blockholders influence the acquisition decision and are able to prevent any non-value 
enhancing proposals made by managers. Numerous studies analyze the impact of 
blockholders on acquisition performance without giving importance to owner type (Yen and 
André, 2007); however, a few recent studies focus on family ownership and find not entirely 
conclusive results. Ben-Amar and André (2006) and Basu et al. (2009) find that family firms 
outperform non-family firms, in Canada and the U.S, respectively. Bauguess and Stegemoller 
(2008) find a negative relation between family ownership and U.S acquirers’ performance.  
Caprio et al. (2011) study Continental European companies and do not find evidence that 
family-controlled firms destroy wealth when they acquire other companies. 
Our analysis contributes to the literature by shedding light on this lack of studies on 
family acquirers and France may be a good framework since there are many family controlled 
firms. All papers cited above are interested in the performance around the announcement date. 
Solely Shim and Okamuro (2011) investigate the impact of family control on long-term 
performance of the acquirers.  
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyses simultaneously the 
short-term, long-term and accounting performance of French acquirer family firms. Our paper 
contributes to the acquisitions literature by using three different measures of family firm’s 
performance. Cosh et al. (2006) and Carline et al. (2009) check the impact of ownership 
structure on announcement date performance, long-term stock performance and operating 
performance, however, they focused on board ownership. We also examine the nonlinearity 
between performances and voting rights. In our opinion, this is the first paper that analyzes 
the role of family control on French acquirers’ performance, even though the French market is 
considered as a concentrated stock ownership market with high level of listed family firms. 
Using a sample of French acquisitions in the period 1997-2006, we show that family 
firms outperform non-family firms. Around the announcement date, family firms realize 
higher abnormal returns than non-family firms. After taking acquirer and acquisition 
characteristics into account, a multivariate analysis confirms this finding. Using the three-year 
return on assets following the acquisition as a measure of performance, we also find that 
family firms are more efficient. We show that the relation between family control and 
operating performance is nonlinear. Regarding the long-term stock performance, the calendar 
time approach indicates better performance of family firms compared to non-family firms. We 
find that the family wedge is not significantly related to the performance. Finally, we perform 
some robustness checks that indicate that our findings do not seem to be affected by the 
endogeneity problem, neither by family firm definition. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the related 
literature on family ownership. Section 3 describes our sample selection process, our 
variables, and methodologies used to measure acquirer performance. The results are presented 
in section 4. Section 5 deals with robustness of the results.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review 
In this section we provide an overview of the existing literature on family firms’ 
characteristics and value. 
 
2.1. Family-controlled firms 
Family firms are common among large, publicly traded firms and an effective organizational 
form. Families usually invest most of their private wealth in the company and their 
investments are not well diversified. Consequently, they have strong economic incentives to 
monitor managers and decrease agency costs. They are considered as a unique group of 
active, long-term owners, holding sustainable equity positions in their firms. The objective of 
most families is the intergenerational transfer of managerial control (Stein, 1988, 1989). 
Agency problems between managers and large shareholders can be reduced or even 
eliminated in family firms, because family members are often present on the board or insure 
the management. In consequence, the incentive alignment effect dominates in family firms 
and managers follow efficient policies. 
Franks et al. (2012) show that different legal and institutional environments make family 
control more value efficient in Europe. Authors conclude that in Continental European 
insider-dominated systems, family ownership is a powerful and persistent arrangement. 
Burkart et al. (2003) formalize the argument that family control may be a substitute for weak 
formal investor protection. In these “insider countries”, characterized by low legal protection 
of investors and the greater importance of banks compared to that of the stock market, Franks 
et al. (2012) suggest that family firms profit from “developed relationship banking” that 
provides access to external financing. Anderson et al. (2003) find that founding family 
ownership is related to a lower cost of debt financing. Authors conclude that founding family 
firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt 
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claimants. Avoiding debt financing thanks to its corporate governance role is less frequent in 
family firms, specifically in those managed by a family member. Pindado et al. (2011) 
confirm that European family firms do not appear to be subject to external financing 
constraints and that they can raise considerable amounts of debt. 
Compared to non-family firms, family firms tend to adopt conservative management 
policies. Caprio et al. (2011) find that family listed firms can engage in significantly less 
frequent acquisitions than non-family firms without negatively affecting their growth. Family 
firms are less likely to make acquisitions especially when the stake held by the family is not 
large enough to assure the persistence of the control. These findings are in line with those of 
Franks et al. (2012) that find that family firms should be concentrated in industries with a 
lower volume of mergers and acquisitions activity as selling family equity stakes is a source 
of dilution of family control. Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) also show that family firms 
make fewer acquisitions than non-family firms do. Given their undiversified investments, 
family firms are more risk adverse than other firms (Bianco et al., 2009; Faccio et al., 2011). 
Even during crises, family firms follow conservative policies (Zhou et al., 2011). Their 
cautious acquisition strategy tends to create economic value while at the same time avoiding 
dilution of control. 
It is important to note that some authors suggest that in family firms, agency conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are dominant due to the 
separation between ownership and control. Morck and Yeung (2003) find that managers may 
act for the controlling family, but not for shareholders in general. Faccio et al. (2001) explain 
that the probability of minority shareholder expropriation is particularly high if large investors 
hold voting rights greater than cash-flow rights. Dyck and Zingales (2004) find that higher 
benefits are associated with a less developed capital market and concentrated ownership. 
Chen (2005) shows that an increase in managerial ownership generally reflects the 
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strengthening of family control or the entrenchment of the controlling owner’s private profits. 
Moreover, Bertrand and Schoar (2006) argue that family values can create efficiency 
distortions if they introduce non-monetary objectives into the founder’s utility maximization 
that run counter to the optimal decisions for the business (e.g.  nepotism, legacy). 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) consider that the family firm definition plays an important 
role when studying their performance.  They show that one must distinguish among three 
fundamental elements in the definition of family firms, namely, ownership, control, and 
management. Miller et al. (2007) also discuss the role of the definition used, and when they 
define a family firm, they take into account a number of variations: the level of ownership and 
voting control, the managerial role played by family members, and the family generation of 
key family members. Burkart et al. (2003) argue that the separation between ownership and 
management depends on the legal environment.  
 
2.2. Family control and firm performance 
Despite the potential agency conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders, 
the positive effects on firm value of family ownership seem to outweigh the possible counter-
argument that large shareholders may use their position to collude with managers in sharing 
private benefits to the detriment of minority shareholders.   
Anderson and Reeb (2003) explain that if monitoring requires knowledge of a firm’s 
technology, families potentially provide superior oversight because their lengthy tenure 
permits them to move further along the firm’s learning curve. The authors report that U.S. 
family firms have higher operating performance and firm value than non-family firms. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) also find that U.S. family firms outperform non-family firms. 
Using a sample of European firms Barontini and Caprio (2006) confirm this finding.  
Moreover, these authors highlight that this out-performance depends on family management. 
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They show that CEO founders create value while CEO descendants destroy value or realize 
performance not distinguishable from non-family firms. Maury (2006) and Andres (2008) 
find that a family firm’s performance is not distinguishable from other firms when families 
are just large shareholders without board representation. Using a sample of French firms, 
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) show that family firms outperform widely-held firms whether the 
CEO is the founder, a descendent or a professional. Ben-Amar and André (2006) examine the 
difference in the market reaction upon the acquisition announcements made by Canadian 
firms. The authors find that family firms outperform non-family firms in the short-term and 
confirm the monitoring hypothesis.   
Morck et al. (1988) suggest that the relation between ownership structure and firm 
performance may be nonlinear if the incentive structure of the equity claimant changes as 
holdings increase. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that firm performance increases until 
families own about one-third of the firm’s outstanding equity. Thereafter, performance begins 
to decline but still better, on average, than in non-family firms. Basu et al. (2009) conclude 
that the incentive alignment effect dominates the entrenchment effect, by providing evidence 
of a significant and convex relationship between newly public firms’ short-term abnormal 
returns and family ownership. The authors suggest that acquirers with low levels of family 
ownership earn lower abnormal returns than do those with high levels of ownership.   
 
3. Data and methodology 
In this section we present our study sample, and different methodologies used to measure 
short-term and long-term performance. Finally, we present our dependent and control 
variables. 
 
3.1. Sample selection 
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The sample of corporate acquisitions is drawn from completed deals undertaken by French 
listed acquirers between January 1997 and December 2006. Operations are identified from 
Thomson One Banker Merger and Acquisition database. Acquisitions involving firms 
operating in highly regulated industries, such as financial and utility sectors, are excluded. 
Acquisitions are defined as occurring when the bidder controls less than 50% of the target’s 
share before the announcement and more than 50% after the transaction. We limit our sample 
to acquisitions whose deal value is more than €1 million and which is at least 1% of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
announcement date. After eliminating firms, which complete more than one acquisition, and 
those, which do not have available data, our final sample includes 239 acquisitions. 
Acquirers’ stock prices are extracted from Datastream database. The relative lack of 
information on private targets is a major impediment to conducting an operating performance 
analysis. We are lead, therefore, to use Worldscope database for listed targets and Orbis 
(VanDijk) database for unlisted targets1. Our sample for operating performance analysis 
consists of 120 acquisitions. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of ownership structure on acquirer short- and 
long-term performances. Pooled regression models using the Mackinnon and White (1985) 
OLS heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance procedure are employed 
over the 1997-2006 period. Our models aim to explain stock and operating performance 
around and following acquisitions.  Consequently, we run the following OLS model: 
 
                                                 
1
 We compare for a sub-sample of 30 listed acquirers and targets, the data available in the two bases, and we 
conclude that there are no data compatibility problems. 
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3.2.1. Measuring acquisition performance 
In this subsection, we present different procedures used to measure announcement and long-
term acquisitions performance. 
 
a/ Short-term stock performance 
We follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard event study methodology to compute 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) three-day around the announcement date. The abnormal 
returns are estimated using the market model, where the benchmark is the return of SBF 250 
index.   
( )2                                                                                        itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  
Rit is the logarithmic return on firm i on day t, Rmt is the logarithmic return on market index on 
day t.  Expected returns are based on a 251-day window prior to the announcement [-261, -
11]. We consider three-day around the announcement date as an event window.   
 
b/ Long-term stock performance 
To measure long-term stock performance, we also use an event study methodology. We use 
the event time approach recommended by Barber and Lyon (1997) and by Kothari and 
Warner (1997). We estimate thirty-six month abnormal performance as cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs), beginning the month following the completion of acquisition2. CARs can be 
used in regression tests because they have the advantage of avoiding some problems relating 
to heteroscedasticity.   
                                                 
2
 Fama (1998) favours CARs and notes that BHARs grow with the return horizon even if there is no abnormal 
return after the first period. 
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Rit is the simple return on firm i on month t, and Rbenchmark,t is the simple return on a control 
firm on month t. 
Following the recommendations of Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) abnormal 
returns are estimated using a control firm3 as a benchmark, selected according to two criteria: 
size and book-to-market. In our study we add industry criteria. To choose the control firm we, 
first, rank all French firms in Datastream, except those that made an acquisition, based on 
their industry using 2-digit SIC code. Second, in each industry group we rank firms based on 
market value of equity. Then we identify all firms with market value of equity between 70% 
and 130% of the market value of the sample firm one year before the acquisition. Finally, 
from this set of firms we choose the firm with a book-to-market ratio closest to that of the 
sample firm. If there is no match, we choose the firm with closest market value of equity. 
 
c/ Operating performance 
Following Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), we compare the post-acquisition performance of 
acquirers with the pre-acquisition weighted average performance of acquirers and targets, 
adjusted to non-acquiring control firms. To obtain the pro-forma pre-acquisition performance 
of the combined firms, we calculate the weighted4 average performance data of the acquirer 
and target firms over the three years before the acquisition (years -3 to -1). To measure the 
change in performance caused by the acquisition, we compare the pre-acquisition adjusted to 
control firm performance with the three-year post-acquisition adjusted performance (year +1 
to +3). Similar to the approach employed by Ghosh (2001), the acquirer firm and the control 
                                                 
3
 We avoid the use of the reference portfolio approach because it’s subject to measurement, new listing, and 
skewness biases when calculating cumulative abnormal returns, it is also sensitive to new listing, rebalancing 
and skewness biases when calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Barber and Lyon 1997). 
4
 The weight for the acquiring firm is its book value of assets divided by the sum of the book value of assets for 
the acquirer and the target firms. 
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firm must have the same 2-digit SIC code, have similar size measured as book value of total 
assets (from 70% to 130%) one year before the acquisition. As a measure of operating 
performance, we divide earnings before tax depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) by total 
assets. 
 
3.2.2. Variables definition 
We present the process of ownership variables construction and the definition of a family 
firm. We describe also control variables used in our models.  Appendix 1 lists all variables 
used in the study. 
 
a/ Independent variables 
Ownership data is manually collected from annual report preceding and closest to the 
acquisition announcement. We use the same methodology as La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens 
et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) to measure the ultimate cash-flow and voting held 
by family and by non-family shareholders. This procedure considers the pyramidal structures 
and the double voting rule. Cash-flow rights are measured after taking into account the whole 
chain of control5. Voting rights are measured as the weakest link in the control chain.   
Family firm: Following Barontini and Caprio (2006), a family firm is determined when an 
individual or a family controls more than 51% of voting rights, or controls more than double 
the voting rights of the second largest shareholder6. Since there are one or more shareholders 
that hold voting rights similar to the family considered as the largest shareholders, Barontini 
and Caprio (2006) conclude that the corporation may be thought of as being controlled by a 
                                                 
5
 If family A owns 60% of direct cash-flow of B and B owns 30% of direct cash-flow of C, family A owns 
ultimately 60%×30% = 18% of cash-flow of C. 
6
 In our family firms defined based on Barontini and Caprio (2006) criteria, one or more family members are 
directors or officers.    
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coalition more than by the family. Furthermore, we check that the individual or the family, 
remain the largest shareholder after the completion of the acquisition7. 
Family wedge: the separation between family control and family participation rights, is 
measured by the ratio of the level of voting rights to the cash-flow rights. 
Non-family blockholder: represent ownership held by banks, insurance or non-financial 
companies when they equal or exceed 5% of cash-flow and voting rights. It represents the 
secondary shareholder in family firms and the main shareholders in non-family firms. We also 
distinguish between insider non-family blockholders represented on the board of directors and 
outsider blockholders not represented on the board8.   
 
b/ Control variables  
Our control variables consider two categories of determinants: acquirer characteristics and 
acquisition characteristics. The acquirer traits that we control for are growth opportunities, 
leverage, cash reserves and firm size.   
Growth opportunities: Numerous works highlight that growth opportunities impact market 
reaction around acquisitions. To control for this effect, we use Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
growth opportunities. Taking into account the results of previous studies (Lang et al., 1991; 
Servaes, 1991), we expect a positive relation between Tobin’s Q and abnormal returns.   
Leverage: Stulz (1990) shows that highly leveraged firms may suffer from an 
underinvestment problem because of a potential shareholders’ wealth expropriation by 
creditors. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) highlight the governance role of leverage since it 
discourages managers from empire building when free cash-flows are high. In order to test 
                                                 
7
 Franks et al. (2012) show that family control is very persistent over time in “insider countries” like France, 
Germany and Italy, compared to “outsider countries” like the U.K. Insider countries are characterized by less 
developed financial markets, lower mergers and acquisitions activity, and weaker investor protection. 
8
 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) consider that a blockholder has substantial voting control to pressure management 
and pay for part of the gains that occur through acquisitions. The authors explain that controlling outside 
shareholders, are viewed as agents of other outside owners, able to minimize poor managerial discretion if their 
control is sufficient to influence an ownership change. 
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these hypotheses, we measure the leverage by dividing the acquirer’s total debt by book value 
of assets. 
Cash reserve: Harford (1999) finds that acquisitions by cash-rich firms are value decreasing 
and that this type of firm is more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are 
less likely to attract other acquirers. Gao (2011) finds that announcement returns are lower for 
a bidder with a higher excess cash reserve. To test this hypothesis, the cash reserve is 
evaluated by the firm cash and cash equivalents level divided by book value of assets. The 
relation between free cash reserve and acquisition performance is expected to be negative. 
Firm size: Several studies show that acquirer size is negatively related to abnormal returns, 
that large acquirers, on average, pay higher premiums and make acquisitions that destroy firm 
value (Moeller et al., 2004). To test this hypothesis, we measure the firm size by the logarithm 
of market value of assets. The relation between acquirer’s size and abnormal returns is 
expected to be negative. 
The acquisition characteristics that we control for are relative deal size, target status 
and method of payment. 
Relative deal size: Moeller et al. (2004) find that the relative deal size ratio is negatively 
related to acquirer abnormal returns. We expect a negative relation between abnormal returns 
and the relative deal size measured by the deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of 
assets. 
Target status: Several studies show that acquirers of listed targets underperform acquirers of 
unlisted targets. Officer (2007) explains this result by the fact that acquirers capture a liquidity 
discount when buying private or subsidiary targets. We introduce a dummy variable equal to 
one if the target is a listed firm. The relation between this variable and abnormal return is 
expected to be negative. 
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Method of payment: Dutta and Jog (2009) find that performance of acquisitions paid with 
stocks is lower than those paid with cash.  The main explanation of these results may be that 
acquirers will use stocks if they think that their shares are overvalued, and will pay with cash 
if they believe their shares are undervalued or correctly valued (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
We introduce a dummy variable equal to one if only stocks are used for payment. The relation 
between this variable and acquisition performance is expected to be negative. 
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides relevant summary statistics of variables and the significance test between 
family and non-family firms. Family firms are acquirers in 33.9% of cases (81 out of 239). 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Panel A shows that mean family ownership is 41.5%, and mean first blockholder ownership is 
19.3% in non-family firms. The separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights is 
higher in family firms, and the difference between these categories of firms is statistically 
significant at the level of 1%. The mean wedge is equal to 13.1% in family firms and to 2.7% 
in non-family ones. 
Panel B show that family firms are smaller than non-family firms. The mean market 
capitalization of family firms is equal to € 1.58 billion, while that of non-family firms is equal 
to € 10.7 billion. However, the relative deal size ratio is similar for the two types of acquirers 
and is around 32%. Tobin’s Q indicates that family firms have higher growth opportunities 
compared to non-family firms. Statistics also indicate that family firms have higher cash 
reserves than non-family firms, 18.1% and 14.2%, respectively. Debt represents about 20% of 
total assets for the two types of acquirers. We find that family firms and non-family firms use 
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only shares as a method of payment in the same way, 19.7% and 20.2%, respectively. Listed 
targets represent 29.6% of family firms’ acquisitions, and they represent 39.2% of non-family 
firms’ acquisitions. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
In this section, we present univariate analysis of acquirer’s short- and long-term performance 
for each type of control. We also present results of OLS regressions realized to test the impact 
of family control on acquisition performance. 
 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 2 shows that French acquirers realize positive abnormal returns of 1 % three days 
around the announcement, significant at the level of 5%. Family firms realize for the same 
event window abnormal returns of 2.81%, significant at the level of 1%. However, non-family 
firms realize weak abnormal returns of 0.08%. The test of difference shows that family firms 
outperform significantly non-family firms around the announcement date. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Thirty-six months following the completion, family firms realize positive, but insignificant, 
abnormal stock returns of 0.47%. Regarding non-family firms, the mean abnormal returns are 
negative insignificant of -9.09%, and the median measure indicates that abnormal returns are 
significantly negative at the level of 10%.   
Median change in operating performance shows that family firms realize an improvement in 
their return on assets, significant at the level of 10%. This improvement is higher than that of 
non-family firms, 0.99% and 0.12% respectively. Univariate analysis supporting the 
 16 
 
hypothesis that research of efficiency dominates the extraction of private benefits in family 
firms, which outperform non-family firms when they acquire. This analysis should be 
completed by a multivariate analysis that controls for firm and acquisition characteristics. 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we investigate whether the ownership structure has an impact on the 
acquisition performance. Moreover, we study the nonlinearities between acquirer performance 
and family control. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are lower than 1.95 across all the models, 
ensuring that there is no serious multicollinearity problem. 
 
4.2.1. Family firms and acquisition performance 
Table 3 presents regression results of the impact of ownership structure on acquirer short and 
long-term performance.  In models (1) to (3), we use cumulative abnormal returns three days 
around the announcement9 as the dependent variable. We find that family control has a 
positive, significant, impact on short-term performance. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
We use three-year stock performance as the dependent variable in models (4) to (6). In 
all models, the impact of family control is positive but not statistically significant. The 
dependent variable in models (7) to (9) is three-year post-acquisition adjusted operating 
performance. Results show that the impact of family control is positive and significant. 
Therefore, after control for acquirer and acquisition characteristics, we obtain results that 
confirm our univariate findings. These results also confirm the hypothesis that incentive 
                                                 
9
 In this models we include year dummy variables (for each year of our sample period) to control for macro 
economic factors.  In unreported regressions we include industry dummy variables (for each 2-digit SIC code) to 
control industry effect, and we find insignificant change in results. 
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efficiency dominates the extraction of private benefits in family firms, and that they benefit 
more from acquisitions than non-family firms do. Our findings are in line with those of Ben-
Amar and André (2006) that find a similar impact in their study of Canadian acquirers and in 
line with those of Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Andres (2008) 
that find a positive impact on firm value. 
This finding can be explained by different reasons. Families usually invest most of their 
private wealth in the company, and the objective of most of them is to ensure a transfer of 
wealth to their descendants. Therefore, they tend to adopt conservative management policies 
and to make fewer acquisitions than non-family firms. This cautious acquisition strategy 
conducts them to acquire only in order to create value. Then, family firms should be efficient 
when selecting the target firm and efficient in the integration process. However, according to 
agency conflicts and to the entrenchment theory, managers of non-family firms tend to realize 
multiple acquisitions in order to build empire and to become indispensable. Our result is in 
line with the finding of Caprio et al. (2011), which states that family firms may engage in 
significantly less frequent acquisitions than non-family firms without negatively affecting 
their growth. Franks et al. (2012) find another explanation for this outperformance. The 
authors highlight that legal and institutional environments make family control more value 
efficient in Europe, and that family ownership is a powerful and persistent arrangement. 
Therefore, family firms have strong economic incentives to decrease agency costs and 
extraction of private benefits. In France, family firms benefit from their developed 
relationships with bankers in an environment giving greater importance to banks than to the 
stock market. Moreover, according to Burkart et al. (2003), family control in France seems to 
be a substitute for weak formal investor protection. 
We find in all models, an insignificant relationship between the family wedge and 
acquisition performance. This result contradicts the evidence of negative value impact of the 
 18 
 
family wedge due to a higher risk of expropriation, documented by Barontini and Caprio 
(2006). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the separation between voting rights and cash-
flow rights leads to value destruction. Studying the impact of non-family blockholder 
ownership on performance, we find that both insider and outsider blockholders have 
insignificant impact on acquisition performance. This result is in line with the findings of 
Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008). Tobin’s Q has a positive significant impact on long-term 
performance, which indicates that firms with high growth opportunities realize a value 
creation when they acquire. However, as expected, firm size and cash reserves have negative 
significant impacts on long-term performance. These results indicate that big acquirers and 
cash-rich acquirers realize value decreasing acquisitions. Furthermore, firm leverage and the 
relative deal size ratio are negatively related to long-term performance. 
 
4.2.2. Nonlinearities between firm performance and family control 
Table 4 investigates the impact of nonlinearities in the effects of family control on acquisition 
performance. To conduct this analysis we relax Barontini and Caprio’s (2006) definition of 
family firms. We define as family firms as those in which a family or an individual is the 
largest shareholder with voting rights superior to 10%. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
In models (1) and (2), the dependent variable is abnormal returns three days around the 
announcement date. We find an insignificant relationship between family control and 
performance at moderate control levels (10-30% and 30-60% of votes). At high level of 
control (60-100% of votes), we find a positive impact of family control, significant at a level 
of 10%. Our results are consistent with those of Basu et al. (2009) who find a similar relation 
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between family ownership and short-term performance. This result shows that at high levels 
of control, there is a better alignment of family interests with those of minority shareholders.  
Therefore, the higher the family control, the higher the market reaction to the acquisition 
announcement.   
In models (3) and (4), the dependent variable is abnormal stock returns thirty-six months 
following the completion. Regardless of the level of family control, we find a positive, but 
insignificant, relation between abnormal returns and family voting rights. In models (5) and 
(6), we use adjusted post-acquisition operating performance as the dependent variable. For an 
intermediate level of control (30-60%), we find a positive and significant relation between 
family control and acquisition performance. For a low and high level of control, the relation is 
positive but insignificant. Therefore, the relation between operating performance and family 
control is nonlinear. This result is in line with Maury’s (2006) that shows that the positive 
impact of family control is pronounced at an intermediate level of control. 
Since the objective of most families is the intergenerational transfer of managerial control, the 
risk of dilution is very pronounced at an intermediate level of control compared to a low or a 
high level of control. In addition, given their undiversified investments, family firms are more 
risk adverse than other firms. Therefore, firms in which families maintain an intermediate 
level of control tend to adopt an acquisition strategy that allows both to create value and to 
avoid dilution of family control. The value creation may also be explained by the monitoring 
role of new blockholders emerging from the acquisition process. At a high level of control, 
the family opportunism may increase and conduct to an extraction of private benefits during 
the years that follow the completion of the transaction (Maury, 2006). 
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5. Robustness checks 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by examining the endogeneity problem 
between ownership and performance, and by using alternative definitions of family firm. In 
addition, we test the nonlinearities between firm performance and family control by using a 
squared polynomial model. Finally, we check the robustness of our results by using 
alternative measures of acquisition performance.   
 
5.1. Endogeneity 
Our analysis potentially suffers from an endogeneity problem (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Loderer and Martin, 1997). Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) argue that both managerial ownership and firm performance may be endogenously 
determined by unobserved characteristics in the firm’s regulation and the stability of the 
environment in which they function. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
In its simplest form, this problem might arise if firm performance caused choices 
about the ownership of the largest shareholder. The observed relation between firm 
performance and family ownership might be the result of a reversed causality. First, we test 
for endogeneity using the Wu-Hausman test as Andres (2008), and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test10 as Roosenboom and Schramade (2006). For all models in tables 3 we find that firm 
performance is not endogenous to family control (p-value varies between 0.62 and 0.80). 
Therefore, the evidence provided by OLS results is not driven by endogeneity. Second, 
although the test rejects endogeneity, we use the instrumental variables (IV-2SLS) technique 
                                                 
10
 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is used as augmented by Davidson and Mackinnon (1993). 
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to address this potential problem. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that ownership is a 
function of firm size and risk. Following, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Barontini and 
Caprio (2006), the occurrence of family control is instrumented using three instruments 11: the 
natural log of total assets, monthly stock return volatility (measured as the standard deviation 
of monthly stock returns 36 months prior to the announcement), and the alpha of stocks 
(measured over 251 days prior to the announcement). We also employ LIML estimates 
instead of traditional 2SLS estimates to avoid the potential problem of weak instrument due to 
the modest correlation between the endogenous variables and our instruments. 
Table 5 presents results of instrumental variable regressions. Regardless of the 
estimation technique, 2SLS or LIML, we find that the estimates from IV regressions are 
consistent with our prior OLS results, suggesting that the coefficient of family firm continues 
to be significantly positive. Similar to the results of Anderson and Reeb (2003), Maury 
(2006), Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008), the evidence 
presented in this paper is not driven by endogeneity of family ownership. 
Since the IV technique is sensitive to the choice of instruments, we use, in unreported 
regressions, three other instruments to check the robustness of our results. These instruments 
are: the natural log of total assets, monthly stock return volatility (measured as the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns 36 months prior to the announcement), and CEO founder 
(a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is the founder of the company or a descendent). 
We obtain similar findings. 
 
5.2. Alternative definitions of family firms 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Miller et al. (2007) highlight the importance of criteria used 
to define a firm as a family firm. Authors explain that it is necessary to distinguish among 
                                                 
11
 We use tests of over-identifying restrictions to test the pertinence of instruments. 
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three fundamental elements in the definition of family firms, namely, ownership, control and 
management. Table 6 shows how definition matters by comparing the differences in 
acquisition performance between family and non-family firms across nine alternative 
definitions of family firm. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
The last three columns of table 6 report coefficients of OLS regressions with three 
dependent variables: announcement period abnormal returns, thirty-six month abnormal 
returns, and adjusted operating performance, respectively. The first four definitions are based 
on control and consider that the family is the largest vote holder. We find that family firms 
outperform non-family firms. When definition is based on ownership (the second four 
definitions), the outperformance of family firms is significant only using operating 
performance. We highlight that results obtained using the definition of Barontini and Caprio 
(2006) are more significant, which indicates that this definition detects the real control by the 
family and allows the family to avoid a coalition taking control. Finally, the last definition is 
based on management. A firm is considered as a family firm if the CEO is the founder or a 
descendent. Results also indicate that family firms outperform non-family firms.   
 
5.3. Nonlinearities between firm performance and family control: Squared polynomial 
model 
To check the robustness of table 4 results, we use a squared polynomial model that consists of 
family voting rights and family voting rights squared. Table 7 presents the results of this 
model. 
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[Insert Table 7] 
 
When we use stock abnormal returns as dependent variables, models (2) and (4) show 
that both family voting rights and family voting rights squared are not significant. However, 
when the dependent variable is post-acquisition operating performance, model (6) confirms 
that the relation between family control and performance is nonlinear. We find that family 
voting rights are positively and significant related to operating performance, and that family 
voting rights squared are negatively and significantly related to performance12. We find an 
inflection point at 61.93% which indicates that operating performance starts to taper off. 
Beyond this level, according to results of table 4, operating performance begins to decline but 
is still insignificantly better than the operating performance of non-family firms. Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) show that family firms outperform non-family firms over the entire range of 
ownership level, peaking at around 30%. Yen and André (2007) find that the operating 
performance of English acquirers starts to decrease beyond the 61.62% level of ultimate 
blockholder ownership. 
 
5.4. Alternative measures of acquisition performance 
Short-term performance: First, we use the adjusted market model instead of the 
market model. Second, we also use different windows to measure the cumulative abnormal 
returns (five days and ten days around the announcement). We find qualitatively unchanged 
univariate and multivariate results.   
Long-term stock performance: First, we use other control firms selected using only 
size and book-to-market criteria and we find similar results. Second, we use buy-and-hold 
                                                 
12
 In an unreported analysis, we include the family voting rights cubed in model (6). We find insignificant 
relations between the three independent variables and operating performance. 
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abnormal returns (BHAR) rather than cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The relation 
between family control and acquisition performance is always positive and not significant. 
Third, as mentioned by Fama (1998), Lyon et al. (1999) and by Mitchell and Stafford (2000), 
the measure of long-term stock performance is sensitive to the methodology used. Therefore, 
we use the calendar time portfolios approach rather than the event time approach. The 
advantage of this approach is that it accounts for cross-dependence among acquisition events. 
We calculate the calendar time abnormal returns as the intercept variable (alpha) of Fama and 
French’s (1993) three- factor model: 
 
( ) (4)                                                    )( pttptpftmtppftpt HMLhSMBsRRRR εβα +++−+=−
 
 
Rpt is the equally weighted13 return on a bidder portfolio in month t. Rft is the risk-free rate 
measured as a one-month Euribor rate. The intercept αp provides a measure of monthly 
abnormal returns during the post-acquisition period.  Rmt is the return on the SBF 250 market 
return. SMBt and HMLt are return differentials on the portfolio between small and large firms, 
and between high book-to-market and low book-to-market firms. SMB and HML are 
calculated using the method employed by Fama and French (1993) based on all French firms 
in Datastream. We estimate the parameters of the model using OLS regression. To control for 
the heteroskedasticity problem that may be due to changes in portfolio composition, we also 
use, following Mitchell and Stafford’s (2000) recommendations, the weighted least square 
(WLS) regression. The weights are proportional to the square root of the number of firms in 
each portfolio. 
[Insert Table 8] 
                                                 
13
 Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that the three factor model using value-weighted returns tends to 
underestimate abnormal returns when the event being studied is a managerial choice variable.   
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Table 8 presents the parameters of the three factor model.  Results indicate that family 
acquirers outperform non-family acquirers. Panel A presents results of OLS regressions.  For 
family firms, the alpha is positive and significant at the level of 1%. For non-family firms the 
alpha is lower and significant only at the level of 10%. After controlling for 
heteroskedasticity, panel B shows that the intercept variable is significant only for family 
firms thirty-six months following the completion. This result confirms the weak 
outperformance of family firms found through the event time approach.    
Operating performance: First, we use another benchmark selected according to 
industry, size and pre-acquisition criteria, as recommended by Barber and Lyon (1996). We 
find similar univariate and multivariate results. Second, as a measure of performance, we use 
EBIT divided by total assets and EBITDA divided by sales rather than EBITDA divided by 
total assets. We find that results are qualitatively unchanged. 
 
5.4. Additional robustness tests 
First, we measure the wedge as the difference between voting rights and cash-flow rights 
rather than the voting rights to cash-flow rights ratio. We find that the relation is always 
insignificant. Second, we consider voting rights of non-family insider blockholder and largest 
outsider blockholder rather than cash-flow rights and we find that results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
 
6.  Summary 
This paper examines the impact of family control on short-term and long-term acquisition 
performance.  Using a sample of 239 French acquisitions during the 1997-2006 period, we 
find that family firms outperform non-family firms when family firms acquire another firm. 
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They attain significantly higher short-term stock performance and long-term operating 
adjusted performance. The calendar time approach shows that the long-term stock 
performance of family firms is significant.  Results show specifically that family firms with a 
high level of control have a positive impact on announcement period performance. However, 
we find a nonlinear relation between family control and operating performance. Our findings 
indicate that research of efficiency dominates extraction of private benefits in family firms. 
We find that non-family blockholders do not have any significant impact on performance 
whether they have representation on the board of directors or not. Finally, we highlight that 
firm performance does not seem to be endogenous to family control, and that our results are 
not highly sensitive to the definition of family firm used. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 All Sample (N = 239) Family (N = 81) Non-Family (N = 158) t-stat (M-
Whitney) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Ownership characteristics  
First Block Own 
Non-Fam Insider  
Largest Outsider 
First Block Wedge 
0.269 
0.126 
0.029 
0.062 
0.223 
0.060 
0.000 
0.019 
0.415 
0.031 
0.032 
0.131 
0.399 
0.000 
0.000 
0.118 
0.193 
0.175 
0.027 
0.027 
0.113 
0.087 
0.000 
0.000 
-8.602*** 
 6.427*** 
-0.750 
-8.602*** 
Panel B: Acquirer and acquisition characteristics  
Market Val (€mil) 
Tobin’s Q 
Relative Deal Size 
Leverage 
Cash Reserve 
Listed Target 
All Shares 
7.641 
1.703 
0.325 
0.209 
0.155 
0.359 
0.200 
1.657 
1.110 
0.133 
0.208 
0.109 
0.000 
0.000 
1.583 
2.015 
0.327 
0.205 
0.181 
0.296 
0.197 
0.418 
1.257 
0.110 
0.194 
0.130 
0.000 
0.000 
10.700 
1.544 
0.323 
0.211 
0.142 
0.392 
0.202 
3.662 
1.034 
0.137 
0.214 
0.097 
0.000 
0.000 
 4.396*** 
-1.771* 
-0.043 
 0.394 
-1.966** 
 1.462 
 0.091 
First block Own is holdings of the ultimate blockholder. Non-Family Insider Own is holdings of the ultimate 
non-family blockholder. Largest Outsider is holdings of blockholder not represented on the board of directors. 
First Block Wedge is the difference between biggest blockholder’s voting rights and cash-flow rights. Market 
Value is measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the acquisition. Tobin’s Q is the sum of the market 
value of assets and total debt divided by book value of assets. Relative Deal Size is the deal value divided by the 
market value. Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Cash Reserve is cash and cash equivalents 
divided by book value of assets. Listed Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if target is a listed company and 0 
otherwise. All Shares is a dummy variable equal to 1 if only shares are used for payment, and 0 otherwise. ***, 
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2: Acquirer performance 
(%) All Sample (N = 239) Family (N = 81) Non-Family (N = 158) t-stat (M-
Whitney) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CAR [-1 ; +1] 
 
CAR (36 months) 
 
∆ Adj Op. Perform 
 
 1.008** 
 (0.016) 
-5.849 
 (0.357) 
 0.889 
 (0.357) 
 0.498*** 
 (0.010) 
-3.255 
 (0.216) 
 0.610 
 (0.367) 
 2.816*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.473 
 (0.964) 
 2.078 
 (0.834) 
 1.355*** 
 (0.001) 
 3.528 
 (0.775) 
 0.998* 
 (0.076) 
 0.081 
 (0.868) 
-9.090 
 (0.253) 
 0.273 
 (0.834) 
 0.253 
 (0.433) 
-6.699* 
 (0.091) 
 0.128 
 (0.964) 
-3.156*** 
-2.487** 
-0.713 
-1.251 
-0.871 
-1.270 
CAR [-1;+1] is cumulative abnormal stock returns three-day around the announcement. CAR (36 months) is 
cumulative abnormal stock returns three years following the completion. ∆Adj Op. Perform is adjusted operating 
performance measured following Healy et al. (1992) methodology. We consider Family Firm those where the family 
controls more than 51% of voting rights or controls more than double the voting rights of the second largest shareholder. t-
statistics are used for means, and Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used for medians. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Acquirers short- and long-term performances regressions 
 Exp 
Signs 
CAR[-1 ; +1] CAR (36 months) Post-acq Adj Performance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Family Firm 
 
Family Wedge 
 
Non-family Insider Own 
 
Largest Outsider Own 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Leverage 
 
Cash Reserve 
 
Acquirer Size 
 
Relative Deal Size 
 
Listed Target 
 
All shares Payment 
 
Pre-acq Performance 
 
CAR[-1 ; +1] 
 
Constant 
 
Year Dummies 
N 
F. Stat 
Adjusted R² 
+ 
 
- 
 
+/- 
 
+/- 
 
+ 
 
+/- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+/- 
 0.023** 
 (0.035) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.001 
 (0.606) 
-0.044 
 (0.161) 
-0.021 
 (0.674) 
-0.001 
 (0.435) 
 0.004 
 (0.618) 
-0.008 
 (0.419) 
-0.023* 
 (0.097) 
 
 
 
 
 0.038 
 (0.329) 
 Yes 
 239 
 1.92** 
 0.056 
 0.027** 
 (0.049) 
-0.010 
 (0.533) 
 
 
 
 
 0.001 
 (0.632) 
-0.043 
 (0.168) 
-0.023 
 (0.645) 
-0.001 
 (0.452) 
 0.003 
 (0.646) 
-0.008 
 (0.431) 
-0.022 
 (0.119) 
 
 
 
 
 0.049 
 (0.234) 
 Yes 
 239 
 1.83** 
 0.053 
 0.028* 
 (0.061) 
-0.011 
 (0.536) 
 0.010 
 (0.716) 
-0.072 
 (0.428) 
 0.001 
 (0.632) 
-0.040 
 (0.215) 
-0.024 
 (0.651) 
-0.002 
 (0.390) 
 0.003 
 (0.665) 
-0.007 
 (0.474) 
-0.022 
 (0.123) 
 
 
 
 
 0.058 
 (0.209) 
 Yes 
 239 
 1.62** 
 0.049 
 0.045 
 (0.760) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.110* 
 (0.076) 
-1.432** 
 (0.023) 
-1.443* 
 (0.070) 
-0.071** 
 (0.034) 
-0.103 
 (0.557) 
-0.151 
 (0.260) 
-0.292 
 (0.202) 
 0.073 
 (0.392) 
-1.356 
 (0.234) 
 1.356** 
 (0.017) 
 
 239 
 2.15** 
 0.065 
 0.032 
 (0.849) 
-0.035 
 (0.861) 
 
 
 
 
 0.109* 
 (0.078) 
-1.430** 
 (0.023) 
-1.452* 
 (0.069) 
-0.071** 
  (0.035) 
-0.104 
 (0.548) 
-0.150 
 (0.259) 
-0.287 
 (0.222) 
 0.074 
 (0.388) 
-1.362 
 (0.236) 
 1.506** 
 (0.021) 
 
 239 
 1.96** 
 0.061 
 0.038 
 (0.837) 
-0.069 
 (0.746) 
 0.242 
 (0.537) 
 1.644 
 (0.387) 
 0.113* 
 (0.069) 
-1.339** 
 (0.028) 
-1.491* 
 (0.061) 
-0.053 
 (0.141) 
-0.119 
 (0.493) 
-0.159 
 (0.249) 
-0.263 
 (0.276) 
 0.074 
 (0.382) 
-1.314 
 (0.256) 
 1.181* 
 (0.067) 
 
 239 
 1.81** 
 0.060 
 0.023** 
 (0.026) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.019** 
 (0.050) 
-0.035 
 (0.674) 
-0.232*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.005 
 (0.179) 
-0.026** 
 (0.015) 
-0.005 
 (0.670) 
 
 
 0.337*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.118 
 (0.270) 
 0.103 
 (0.150) 
 
 120 
 9.23*** 
 0.325 
 0.019* 
 (0.086) 
 0.025 
 (0.785) 
 
 
 
 
 0.019* 
 (0.052) 
-0.034 
 (0.682) 
-0.231*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.005 
 (0.169) 
-0.026** 
 (0.016) 
-0.006 
 (0.654) 
 
 
 0.336*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.122 
 (0.252) 
 0.104 
 (0.144) 
 
 120 
 9.58*** 
 0.320 
 0.031** 
(0.029) 
 0.008 
 (0.919) 
 0.068 
 (0.168) 
-0.057 
 (0.580) 
 0.018** 
 (0.045) 
-0.028 
 (0.736) 
-0.254*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.005 
 (0.176) 
-0.028** 
 (0.013) 
-0.005 
 (0.685) 
 
 
 0.340*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.109 
 (0.320) 
 0.102 
 (0.212) 
 
 120 
 10.66*** 
 0.323 
CAR[-1;+1] is short-term stock performance. CAR (36 months) is long-term stock performance. Post-acq Adj Pfce is operating performance. Family Firm is a dummy equal to 1 if the family 
controls more than 51% of voting rights or controls more than double the voting rights of the second largest shareholder. Family Wedge is the ratio of the level of voting rights to the level of 
cash-flow rights. Non-family Insider Own is holdings of the ultimate non-family blockholder represented on the board. Largest Outsider is holdings of blockholder not represented on the board. 
Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value of assets and total debt divided by book value of assets. Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Cash Reserve is cash and cash equivalents 
divided by book value of assets. Acquirer Size is the logarithm of market value. Relative Deal Size is the deal value divided by the market value. Listed Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
target is a listed company. All Shares Payment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if only shares are used for payment. Pre-acq Performance is 36 month pre-acquisition CAR in models (4) to (6), 
and 3 year pre-acquisition adjusted operating performance in models (7) to (9). Statistical significance is corrected for heterocedasticity using McKinnon and White (1985) adjustment. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Nonlinearities between firm performance and family control 
 CAR[-1 ; +1] CAR (36 months) Post-acq Adj Pfce 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fam_Votes [10 ; 30%] 
 
Fam_Votes [30 ; 60%] 
 
Fam_Votes [60 ; 100%] 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Leverage 
 
Cash Reserve 
 
Acquirer Size 
 
Relative Deal Size 
 
Listed Target 
 
All Shares Payment 
 
Pre-acq Performance 
 
CAR[-1 ; +1] 
 
Constant 
 
Year Dummies  
N 
F. Stat 
Adjusted R² 
 
 
 0.004 
 (0.721) 
 0.021* 
 (0.074) 
 0.002 
 (0.463) 
-0.036 
 (0.250) 
-0.013 
 (0.789) 
-0.002 
 (0.249) 
 0.003 
 (0.696) 
-0.008 
 (0.444) 
-0.023 
 (0.103) 
 
 
 
 
 0.055 
 (0.184) 
 Yes 
 239 
 1.72** 
 0.036 
-0.008 
 (0.665) 
 0.002 
 (0.853) 
 0.018* 
 (0.081) 
 0.002 
 (0.448) 
-0.038 
 (0.225) 
-0.014 
 (0.774) 
-0.003 
 (0.199) 
 0.003 
 (0.707) 
-0.008 
 (0.423) 
-0.022 
 (0.101) 
 
 
 
 
 0.061 
 (0.137) 
 Yes 
 239 
 1.60* 
 0.033 
 
 
 0.044 
 (0.807) 
 0.033 
 (0.867) 
 0.110* 
 (0.078) 
-1.425** 
 (0.026) 
-1.431* 
 (0.076) 
-0.067* 
 (0.074) 
-0.098 
 (0.577) 
-0.154 
 (0.260) 
-0.285 
 (0.208) 
 0.073 
 (0.399) 
-1.414 
 (0.225) 
1.396** 
 (0.040) 
 
 239 
 2.00** 
 0.061 
 0.036 
 (0.903) 
 0.054 
 (0.744) 
 0.023 
 (0.899) 
 0.110* 
 (0.075) 
-1.433** 
 (0.019) 
-1.434* 
 (0.074) 
-0.069** 
 (0.043) 
-0.099 
 (0.571) 
-0.156 
 (0.255) 
-0.282 
 (0.194) 
 0.074 
 (0.392) 
-1.423 
 (0.231) 
 1.429** 
 (0.016) 
 
 239 
 1.95** 
 0.057 
 
 
 0.024** 
 (0.047) 
 0.022 
 (0.328) 
 0.018* 
 (0.051) 
-0.031 
 (0.708) 
-0.228*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.005 
 (0.141) 
-0.027** 
 (0.015) 
-0.007 
 (0.591) 
 
 
 0.333*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.130 
 (0.220) 
 0.106 
 (0.124) 
 
 120 
 9.95*** 
 0.320 
 0.009 
 (0.696) 
 0.023* 
 (0.061) 
 0.021 
 (0.396) 
 0.018* 
 (0.053) 
-0.033 
 (0.699) 
-0.230*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.005 
 (0.145) 
-0.027** 
 (0.013) 
-0.007 
 (0.578) 
 
 
 0.334*** 
(0.000) 
 0.129 
 (0.237) 
 0.112 
 (0.141) 
 
 120 
 9.06*** 
 0.314 
CAR[-1;+1] is short-term stock performance. CAR(36 months) is long-term stock performance. Post-acq Adj 
Pfce is operating performance. Fam_Votes [10;30%] is a dummy equal to 1 if  controlling shareholders is a 
family with votes ≥10% but <30%. Fam_Votes [30;60%] is a dummy equal to 1 if  controlling shareholders is a 
family with votes ≥30% but <60%. Fam_Votes [60;100%] is a dummy equal to 1 if  controlling shareholders is a 
family with votes ≥60. Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value of assets and total debt divided by book value of 
assets. Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Cash Reserve is cash and cash equivalents divided 
by book value of assets. Acquirer Size is the logarithm of market value. Relative Deal Size is the deal value divided 
by the market value. Listed Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if target is a listed company. All Shares 
Payment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if only shares are used for payment. Pre-acq Performance is 36 month 
pre-acquisition CAR in models 3 and 4, and 3 year pre-acquisition adjusted operating performance in models 5 
and 6. Statistical significance is corrected for heterocedasticity using McKinnon and White (1985) adjustment. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Instrumental variable regressions 
 CAR[-1 ; +1] Post-acq Adj Pfce 
 
2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML 
 
(1) (2) (5) (6) 
Family Firm 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Leverage 
 
Cash Reserve 
 
Acquirer Size 
 
Relative Deal Size 
 
Listed Target 
 
All Shares Payment 
 
Constant 
 
Year Dummies  
N 
Wald. Stat 
Adjusted R² 
 
Tests of over-identifying restrictions: 
Sargan 
Basmann 
Anderson-Rubin  
 0.022** 
 (0.038) 
 0.002 
 (0.601) 
-0.040 
 (0.198) 
-0.016 
 (0.749) 
-0.002 
 (0.530) 
 0.003 
 (0.656) 
-0.007 
 (0.453) 
-0.025* 
 (0.084) 
 0.056 
 (0.476) 
 Yes 
 239 
 31.93** 
 0.051 
 
 
 (0.149) 
 (0.161) 
 0.026** 
 (0.041) 
 0.002 
 (0.616) 
-0.039 
 (0.250) 
-0.016 
 (0.748) 
-0.003 
 (0.602) 
 0.003 
 (0.714) 
-0.007 
 (0.503) 
-0.025* 
 (0.097) 
 0.065 
 (0.563) 
 Yes 
 239 
 31.36** 
 
 
 
 
 (0.163) 
 (0.137) 
 0.018** 
 (0.022) 
 0.035*** 
 (0.003) 
-0.044 
 (0.560) 
-0.315*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.009 
 (0.259) 
-0.024* 
 (0.097) 
-0.015 
 (0.293) 
 
 
 0.163 
 (0.231) 
 
 120 
 22.28*** 
 0.154 
 
 
 (0.484) 
 (0.510) 
 0.024** 
 (0.035) 
 0.035*** 
 (0.004) 
-0.042 
 (0.585) 
-0.315*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.009 
 (0.282) 
-0.025 
 (0.104) 
-0.016 
 (0.292) 
 
 
 0.175 
 (0.255) 
 
 120 
 9.06*** 
  
 
 
 
 (0.511) 
 (0.482) 
Instruments are: the natural log of total assets, monthly stock return volatility (measured as the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns 36 months prior the announcement), and the alpha of stocks (measured over 
251 days prior the announcement). CAR[-1;+1] is short-term stock performance. CAR (36 months) is long-term 
stock performance. Post-acq Adj Pfce is operating performance. Family Firm is a dummy equal to 1 if the family 
controls more than 51% of voting rights or controls more than double of the voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder. Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value of assets and total debt divided by book value of assets. 
Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Cash Reserve is cash and cash equivalents divided by 
book value of assets. Acquirer Size is the logarithm of market value. Relative Deal Size is the deal value divided by 
the market value. Listed Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if target is a listed company. All Shares Payment 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if only shares are used for payment. Statistical significance is corrected for 
heterocedasticity using White (1980) adjustment. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Effect of the definition of “family firm” on short- and long-term performances 
Definition of family firm % of family 
firm in the 
sample 
OLS Coefficient 
CAR [-1 ; +1] 
OLS Coefficient 
CAR (36 mois) 
OLS Coefficient 
Post-acq Adj.  
Performance 
1. The family is the largest vote 
holder and has at least 10% of the 
votes 
43%  0.007 
 (0.280) 
 0.099 
 (0.406) 
 0.025* 
 (0.065) 
2. The family is the largest vote 
holder and has at least 20% of the 
votes 
36%  0.019* 
 (0.061) 
 0.073 
 (0.589) 
 0.033** 
 (0.022) 
3. The family is the largest vote 
holder and has at least 30% of the 
votes 
31%  0.017* 
 (0.066) 
 0.059 
 (0.634) 
 0.037** 
 (0.029) 
4. Family voting rights 
 
 
  0.020* 
 (0.081) 
 0.018 
 (0.936) 
 0.024* 
 (0.063) 
5. The family is the largest 
shareholder and has at least 10% of 
the cash-flow rights 
41%  0.014 
 (0.237) 
 0.291 
 (0.315) 
 0.022** 
 (0.043) 
6. The family is the largest 
shareholder and has at least 20% of 
the cash-flow rights 
33%  0.011 
 (0.194) 
 0.003 
 (0.976) 
 0.026* 
 (0.081) 
7. The family is the largest 
shareholder and has at least 30% of 
the cash-flow rights 
23%  0.013 
 (0.241) 
 0.051 
 (0.728) 
 0.027 
 (0.121) 
8. Family ownership 
 
 
  0.033 
 (0.137) 
 0.238 
 (0.317) 
 0.482* 
 (0.093) 
9. The CEO is a founder or a 
descendant 
 
34%  0.022** 
 (0.028) 
  0.041 
 (0.823) 
 0.031* 
 (0.075) 
This table reports the coefficient of the independent variable in OLS regressions. CAR[-1;+1] is short-term stock 
performance. CAR (36 months) is long-term stock performance. Post-acq Adj Pfce is operating performance. 
Control variables are those used in table 2. Statistical significance is corrected for heterocedasticity using 
McKinnon and White (1985) adjustment. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7: Nonlinearities between firm performance and family control: Squared polynomial model 
 CAR[-1 ; +1] CAR (36 months) Post-acq Adj Pfce 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fam_Votes 
 
(Fam_Votes) ² 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Leverage 
 
Cash Reserve 
 
Acquirer Size 
 
Relative Deal Size 
 
Listed Target 
 
All Shares Payment 
 
Pre-acq Performance 
 
CAR[-1 ; +1] 
 
Constant 
 
Year Dummies  
N 
F. Stat 
Adjusted R² 
 0.020* 
 (0.081) 
  
 
 0.002 
 (0.474) 
-0.036 
 (0.225) 
-0.016 
 (0.742) 
-0.003 
 (0.223) 
 0.003 
 (0.702) 
-0.007 
 (0.474) 
-0.024* 
 (0.089) 
 
 
 
 
 0.058 
 (0.163) 
 Yes 
 239 
 1.71** 
 0.037 
 0.017 
 (0.938) 
 0.003 
 (0.783) 
 0.002 
 (0.467) 
-0.036 
 (0.228) 
-0.015 
 (0.757) 
-0.003 
 (0.217) 
 0.003 
 (0.713) 
-0.007 
 (0.471) 
-0.024* 
 (0.090) 
 
 
 
 
 0.060 
 (0.154) 
 Yes 
 239 
 1.60* 
 0.033 
 0.018 
 (0.936) 
 
 
 0.108* 
 (0.076) 
-1.438** 
 (0.026) 
-1.441* 
 (0.075) 
-0.065* 
 (0.073) 
-0.096 
 (0.579) 
-0.154 
 (0.259) 
-0.289 
 (0.203) 
 0.068 
 (0.421) 
-1.399 
 (0.228) 
1.371** 
 (0.039) 
 
 239 
 2.17** 
 0.064 
-0.675  
 (0.250) 
 0.850 
 (0.201) 
 0.112* 
 (0.071) 
-1.445** 
 (0.026) 
-1.421* 
 (0.078) 
-0.073** 
 (0.042) 
-0.109 
 (0.528) 
-0.156 
 (0.251) 
-0.275 
 (0.221) 
 0.080 
 (0.347) 
-1.443 
 (0.206) 
 1.511** 
 (0.021) 
 
 239 
 2.23** 
 0.065 
 0.024* 
 (0.063) 
  
 
 0.019** 
 (0.046) 
-0.027 
 (0.743) 
-0.227*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.006* 
 (0.099) 
-0.027** 
 (0.016) 
-0.006 
 (0.650) 
 
 
 0.335*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.132 
 (0.200) 
 0.117 
 (0.101) 
 
 120 
 9.07*** 
 0.319 
 0.120** 
 (0.028) 
-0.116** 
 (0.039) 
 0.018** 
 (0.048) 
-0.024 
 (0.764) 
-0.220*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.004 
 (0.223) 
-0.025** 
 (0.022) 
-0.007 
 (0.603) 
 
 
 0.336*** 
(0.000) 
 0.131 
 (0.205) 
 0.093 
 (0.221) 
 
 120 
 8.66*** 
 0.323 
Inflection Point     61.93% 
CAR[-1;+1] is short-term stock performance. CAR (36 months) is long-term stock performance. Fam_Votes is 
the voting rights of family. Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value of assets and total debt divided by book value 
of assets. Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Cash Reserve is cash and cash equivalents 
divided by book value of assets. Acquirer Size is the logarithm of market value. Relative Deal Size is the deal value 
divided by the market value. Listed Target is a dummy variable equal to 1 if target is a listed company. All 
Shares Payment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if only shares are used for payment. Pre-acq Performance is 36 
month pre-acquisition CAR in models 3 and 4, and 3 year pre-acquisition adjusted operating performance in 
models 5 and 6. Statistical significance is corrected for heterocedasticity using McKinnon and White (1985) 
adjustment. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Long-term abnormal returns using calendar time portfolios approach 
  α (%) Market SMB HML Adj. R² [F] 
Panel A: using OLS regression to estimate the alpha 
All Firms 
 
Family Firms 
 
Non Family Firms 
0.845*** 
(0.007) 
1.052*** 
(0.006) 
0.665* 
(0.077) 
1.230*** 
(0.000) 
1.319*** 
(0.000) 
1.175*** 
(0.000) 
0.780*** 
(0.000) 
1.103*** 
(0.000) 
0.595*** 
(0.000) 
0.343*** 
(0.002) 
0.249* 
(0.054) 
0.332*** 
(0.009) 
0.804*** 
[189.86] 
0.772*** 
[161.86] 
0.741*** 
[108.05] 
Panel A: using WLS regression to estimate the alpha 
All Firms 
 
Family Firms 
 
Non Family Firms 
0.717** 
(0.015) 
0.888*** 
(0.009) 
0.604 
(0.128) 
1.208*** 
(0.000) 
1.289*** 
(0.000) 
1.161*** 
(0.000) 
0.680*** 
(0.000) 
1.040*** 
(0.000) 
0.490*** 
(0.000) 
0.264*** 
(0.000) 
0.213** 
(0.040) 
0.245** 
(0.019) 
0.843*** 
[210.08] 
0.791*** 
[217.24] 
0.790*** 
[123.03] 
Family firm is determined when an individual or a family controls more than 51% of voting rights, or controls 
more than double the voting rights of the second largest shareholder. The alphas are calculated for 36 months 
following the completion using Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. The weights in WLS technique are 
N where N is the number of firms in each portfolio. Statistical significance is corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation using the Newey-West (1987) adjustment. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
